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Abstract. Network security should be based around security policies.
From high-level natural language, non-technical, policies created by man-
agement, down to device and vendor specic policies, or congurations,
written by network system administrators. There exists a multitude of
research into policy-based network systems which has been undertaken.
This paper provides an overview of the dierent type of policies relating
to security in networks, and a taxonomy of the research into systems
which have been proposed to support the network administrators in dif-
cult tasks of creating, managing and deploying these policies.
1 Security Policies
High-level security policy documents should be written by upper management
and should be the `what' of security in the organisation. Without this denition
of the security goals, it is dicult to use security mechanisms eectively [1]. The
implementation, or technical policies, are then created from the overall high-level
policy. This is the `how' and it is used to enforce the security policy. The term
policy is used in the literature to describe both the high-level policies, as well as
the low-level implemented rules. The processes of security policy creation and
implementation are shown in gure 1, and a good denition of an overall security
policy is taken from The Site Security handbook - RFC2196 [1]:
\A security policy is a formal statement of the rules by which people
who are given access to an organization's technology and information
assets must abide." [1].
RFC2196 [1] provides an excellent reference for network system adminis-
trators and management-level decision makers, when creating network security
policies. At its core is a ve-step iterative process detailing the Security Policy
creation and maintenance process. A key element of this is that the denition of
a security policy is an ongoing process, with regular reviews and auditing of se-
curity policies and mechanisms, providing feedback to improve it. This matches
two fundamental concepts: security being an integral part of the design and
systems being an ongoing process - rather than simply the implementation of
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Fig. 1. Network Security Policy
security products - which are both common throughout security literature [2, 3].
The Site Security Handbook does not put forward a formal method of specifying
the policies, but denes:
1. Identify what you are trying to protect.
2. Determine what you are trying to protect it from.
3. Determine how likely the threats are.
4. Implement measures which will protect your assets in a cost eective manner.
5. Review the process continuously and make improvements each time a weak-
ness is found.
Industry recognised standards frameworks can be used to help create the se-
curity policy, based on industry best practices (as shown in Figure 1). Currently,
the two best known frameworks are COBIT and the ISO27002 Code of Practice
for Information Security Management (previously ISO 17799). These provide
detailed industry standards in IT security management and audit compliance
[4].
It is important to involve users in the implementation of a security policy and
the understanding of security problems by users, and giving them clear and easy
to follow rules, can be a key factor in the successful implementation of the policy
[5]. Danchev calls this the \Security Awareness program" and emphasises that
the latest technical security measures, such as rewalls and IDPSs (Intrusion
Detection/Prevention), can be rendered useless by careless, or badly informed,
end-users. The User's Security Handbook [6], the companion guide to the Site
Security Handbook [1], can be used as a guide on how to educate users about
the dangers of networked systems and how to keep data and communications
safe.
Although management should have a good deal of input into the high-level
security policies, they may also need technical input due to the nature of the
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services they describe. Ideally they should be created by sta with the executive
power of the CEO of the organisation, and the technical ability of a system
administrator. Typically administrators will help create the policies and the
management will make the nal decisions, but sometimes business plans will
trump security policy decisions [2].
2 Enforcing Policies
Security policies protect the condentiality, integrity, and availability of the as-
sets of an organisation. To enforce this security services should to be deployed,
such as authentication, encryption, antivirus software, and rewalls. To do this
the security policy documents are often used to create technical security pro-
cedures, and guidelines, which can then be implemented in the network. Types
of procedures include: identication or authentication; access control or autho-
rization; and accountability or auditing procedures. Procedures and guidelines
could be created for each of the dierent type of security mechanisms to be
used to enforce the policy. These technical mechanisms include authentication
systems, rewalls, proxy servers, IDPSs, VPNs, and access control systems [7].
The guidelines are best practice suggestions for each, and the procedures are
specications for implementation of the specic security measures. This process
is shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Enforcing Security Policy
Security Policies can be split into several components, which combine to
achieve the security goals of the organisation. These components are enforced
by various security mechanisms or procedures. The authentication policy could
be enforced using user names and passwords, software tokens, and/or VPNs. The
accountability policy may use IDPs and rewalls to enforce auditing and incident
response capabilities. The Access Control Policy, which this work focuses on,
would typically use rewalls, VPNs and authorization systems to enforce access
to resources [1].
The access control part of the security policy deals with making sure that
authorized individuals can perform the tasks they are authorized to, and that
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others cannot. It is typically referred to as the `access control policy' [7]. Access
control makes sure that requests to access a specic resource are only granted
if the request agrees with the security policy denition. In terms of networks,
the most commonly used access control mechanisms are rewalls and ltering
routers [8]. Firewalls control access to resources by ltering network trac, only
allowing access that is specied by the security policy.
The network access control policies, dening which trac can cross network
boundaries, are implemented as policies on network devices which have access
control functionality, such as trac ltering capabilities. The system admin-
istrator is typically tasked with manually creating these low-level policies, or
congurations. In order to determine whether to grant an access request, access
control mechanisms uses a number of criteria. The primary criterion being the
network address of the machine from which the trac originates. Other criteria,
which can decide whether access is granted or not, would include network ser-
vice and destination of the trac [8]. The most common technique used to by
rewalls to lter trac is known as Packet Filtering.
Implementation of security mechanisms can be based on best practices, and
several sets of guidelines exist. The NSA and NIST publish conguration guide-
lines for implementing security controls. The Cisco SAFE framework provides
detailed guidelines for the implementation of network security mechanisms for
various dierent sizes of networks and dierent site specic setups [9]. A com-
pilation of the most common policy errors are detailed by Wool in his review
of rewall conguration problems [10], and provide guidelines on what to avoid
when implementing rewall policies.
2.1 Policy Enforcement Problems
If the high-level policies are not dened correctly, the implementation cannot
provide the security protection need by the organisation. As described by Wool
in his review of rewall conguration problems [10], and as a major motivation
for the rewall auditing and testing system described in the latest research by
Mayer, Wool, and Ziskind [11]:
\the protection that these rewalls provide, is only as good as the policy
they are congured to implement" { [11]
The policy should be clear, concise, and easy for the administrator to follow.
If a policy is not well designed, then it will not be enforced properly and the
security goals will not be met [12].
Conversely, polices are only as good as the congurations which enforce
them [13, 14]. The enforcement of policies is not always an easy task. Policy
management can be dicult as policies grow and become increasingly complex
[15, 16, 10]. Blakley makes the following statement in [15].
\Policies do not scale well and their complexity quickly increases as sys-
tems grow and diverge, which makes them unmanageable" { [15]
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Madigan et al. categorises violations of security policies, and shows that vio-
lations from network issues were by far the largest type reported [12]. The author
also states that the network violations were among the most time consuming to
correct. This work was based on real security policy violations, on two univer-
sity campuses, over a two year period. This could be a direct result of policy
enforcement problems, such as policy conguration errors and anomalies. This is
not surprising, as it is generally accepted by security experts that rewalls and
other trac ltering devices are poorly congured [10].
The conguration of a rewall is probably the most important factor in terms
of the security a rewall provides [17], but are often congured incorrectly [10].
Firewall policies are made up of rule sets, and these rule sets are ever expanding
due to new rules continually being added and very few removed, so device access
policies tend to be large and always increasing in size [10, 18]. It follows that the
management of these policies at the network device level can be extremely com-
plex, error-prone and expensive as the policies expand [19]. The congurations
are typically hand crafted and bespoke for each individual system by network
administrators, which can be error prone work [20]. This is a serious problem as
errors in the rewall policies mean that the intended security policy will not be
enforced.
Mapping the high-level security policies to the lower level implementation
can be extremely dicult [7]. High-level policies are written in a natural lan-
guage, and describe security aims in terms of entities of an organisation, such as
networks, users and resources. Enforcement policies are in terms of the points
of enforcement, or devices. Firewalls and other devices have their own vendor
specic languages and tools, which tend to be very low-level. Many researchers
have used the simile that these conguration languages are `like programming in
assembly languages' [19]. A conceptual gap exists between the two, and adminis-
trators can nd it very dicult to map from one to the other correctly (to bridge
the gap) [21, 20, 22]. GUIs are provided by some vendors, but most require the
administrator to click through several windows, simple to understand a single
rule fully [11].
Administrators are typically tasked with the creation of the low-level device
policies, which implement the security policy of the organization. In terms of
rewalls, these are the rewall rule sets. The administrators will add, delete,
and change the rules to match changes to the high-level security requirements.
For example, when new web servers are added to the organisation's network,
new rules would be added to the perimeter rewalls to allow appropriate access
to them from outside and inside the organisation's network. The complexity
of the rule sets increase as they increase in size, but also the complexity can
change depending on the rules used within them. For example, OSI layer 3
packet ltering is not as challenging to understand as OSI layer 4 or layer 7
ltering due to less ltering elds in each ltering rule. The ltering rules can
be based on source address only or source and destination, as well as various
other trac attributes within a rule. Wool created a classication system for
complexity of rule sets, based on the number of rules, the objects (trac ltering
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parameters) and the interfaces rules could be applied to. In [10] the following
rule set complexity measure is dened:
Rule Complexity = Number of Rules + Network Objects + Number of
Interfaces(Number of Interfaces -1) / 2 { [10]
For most rewalls the ordering of the rules in a rule set are important, as in
the common `rst match' ltering mechanism, the position of the rules in the
rule set dictate if they are matched against trac or not. The earlier in the rule
set the higher the priority the rule has when matching against trac [23]. Thus
ltering rule sets, that use rst match semantics, are complicated to create and
amend due to this dependency on the rule ordering. As the size and complexity of
the rule set increases it becomes more dicult for the administrator to predict
the impact of a rule on the overall rule set. This makes rule sets extremely
dicult to manage [10].
Eectiveness of security policies can be compromised due to poor policy man-
agement, especially when enforcing a security policy across a range of devices
around a network [24]. Security policies can be spread over a range of dierent
security devices [25]. Packets can take multiple paths through a network, with
multiple ltering devices on each dierent path. An administrator needs to un-
derstand the interaction of combinations of these devices for each trac path
[11]. The low-level congurations, which implement the security policy, can span
heterogeneous networks, and may be spread over many network devices. Dierent
vendors implement dierent algorithms and low-level languages for conguring
their devices. Thus, the scope of the deployment in terms of devices, can also
increase the diculty of the task of policy enforcement for the system admin-
istrators [20]. If hundreds of network devices have to be coordinated to enforce
a network security policy, manual translation of the policy into device cong-
urations, can become extremely complex and error prone. If multiple devices
such as rewalls, from dierent vendors, have to be used to create overlapping
enforcement policies, in order to enforce a single global security policy, this adds
even more complexity.
2.2 Policy Enforcement Solutions
Abrams [26] describes a layered approach which can be taken with security poli-
cies. This can help the management, administrators, and users understand the
policy and its implementation, as the mapping between the high-level policy
and the low-level deployment is more clearly dened. Dierent individuals in an
organisation will have a dierent view of the security policy. At a management
level, an enterprise wide view concerning overall security objectives, such as pro-
tect the company's assets, will be taken. This is the highest level of abstraction
of the policy, and it should be easy to understand, but does not contain guid-
ance in how to carry out the security requirements. To do this policies at a lower
level of abstraction need to be introduced. At the users level of abstraction, the
policy is seen as rules relating to access to resources and data, such as systems
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and applications [26]. The high-level policy is translated into this level of pol-
icy abstraction, providing guidance for users [6]. This level might be dened in
terms of nite-state machines, or as access matrixes [27, 7]. The lowest level of
abstraction is the network implementation level, were the security mechanisms
are deployed to satisfy the higher level specications.
The policy can be shown in three dierent ways: rst as a high-level pol-
icy described in a natural language, secondly as formal statements to describe
a model of the policy, or thirdly as a technical implementation [7, 26]. Natu-
ral language is prone to ambiguities, thus the high-level policy may also have
ambiguities in terms of the security requirements. If the policy is modeled in a
formal language, the ambiguities can be reduced, or even removed completely.
The formal model can also be used to audit the security procedures for compli-
ance with the requirements, and it provides a specication free of any specic
implementation methods, such as vendor specic tools and languages. The down-
side is that specialists are needed to work with such models, especially if they
are mathematical models. Otherwise administrators, who implement the secu-
rity mechanisms, would have to learn such modeling techniques. A formal model
which is non mathematical, such as a more formal natural language, can be a
good compromise. The ambiguities from the high-level language can be reduced,
and the modeling language would be understood by a wider range of individuals.
Tasking specialised individuals with such work, such as rewall administrators,
is preferable to asking general system administrators to carry out such tasks [3].
Samarati [7] outline how the dierent levels of abstraction provide the ben-
ets of separating the requirements and design, from the implementation. The
security requirements can be dealt with, regardless of how are they are to be im-
plemented, and dierent methods of implementation can be compared against
each other for the same requirements. The formal model could also be used to
prove the security proposed is sound, and possibly even to automate the imple-
mentation of the security mechanisms, by creating device congurations from
the model denition [28].
Various policy management systems have been proposed to help the network
administrators with the creation, management, analysis, and auditing of these
complex policies. The next section presents a taxonomy of research into these
systems and tools, along with comparisons between the dierent approaches.
Packet ltering rewalls are one of the most important mechanisms used by
organisations to implement their security policies, and in the past 10 years, there
has been a great deal of research into the areas of rewall policy management.
The taxonomy and review of the literature is therefore focused on research into
rewall policy-based systems.
3 Firewall Policy Management Systems
3.1 Introduction
Systems which can assist administrators in the creation and management of net-
work access policies, can be used in the various stages of security development
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and operations. Network security should be a continual process, built around
the network security policy, and it should be integrated into all stages of the
SDLC [2]. Many denitions exist for the SDLC, with possibly the best known
being the Waterfall Model, in which the development process is described by
several phases in a downward ow. The phases for general development are typ-
ically Requirements Analysis, Design, Implementation, and Maintenance. More
specically, for security system development, the NIST process denition is de-
ned in special publications 800-14 [29] and 800-64 [30]. This includes security
system Initiation, Development, Implementation, Operation and Maintenance,
and Disposal.
Fig. 3. System Life Cycle
In the NIST denition the initiation phase is concerned with security plan-
ning, including documenting the need and high-level requirements for the sys-
tem. The Development phase includes the design, purchasing and creation of
the system. Implementation involves the testing, and subsequent installation of
the system. The Operation phase takes place once the system is in production,
and includes the monitoring and auditing of the security mechanisms, and any
conguration management.
The policy management systems, discussed in this section, can be categorised
by which phase of the development life cycle they operate in. A simplied secu-
rity development life cycle, showing the stages which contain the most relevant
literature, is shown in Figure 3.
Computers and Security 9
3.2 Factors used to Compare Systems
The main factors which are used to compare systems include:
{ Modeling Technique high-level, abstract, languages can be used to de-
scribe the policy model. Some systems introduce new high-level languages
to describe rewall policies. These can be graphical languages, or abstract
textual languages similar to high-level programming languages. These high-
level languages can then be translated into the vendor specic conguration
language and be implemented on rewalls or routers. Some systems are based
around the low-level vendor specic languages, which the system administra-
tors are already familiar with. Another method is to keep the language tech-
nically similar to the low-level vendor languages, but abstract just enough
to be used across a heterogeneous network, such as a XML based language.
Systems can also be based around formal models, such as BDDs, bipartite
graphs, or relational databases.
{ Top-Down or Bottom-Up - Systems can be regarded as having a bottom-
up approach if the starting point, or input to the system, is from device
policy. These systems may create an abstract policy model, analyse, or ag-
gregate the policy into a higher level policy, but always start with a concrete
policy from a network device. Top-down systems start from high-level de-
scriptions, possibly a security policy. They typically create an abstract model
of a policy, which then can be compiled into the low-level technical policies
and then deployed on devices.
{ Scope Some of the systems describe a single network device policy, and
some allow the description of entire network security policy which maps to
policies for multiple rewalls.
{ User Interface - The systems, which have been implemented as tools, are
typically split between having either a CLI, or a GUI, which is an important
consideration, depending on which tasks the system performs and which type
of user the system is aimed at [31].
{ Administration tool design issues Issues raised on the subject of ad-
ministration and security tool design highlight factors such as exibility,
customisability, usability, and error reporting techniques [32].
3.3 SDLC Development Phase
In this phase of the development life cycle, a risk assessment is carried out,
which species the security requirements necessary to protect an organisation's
network-based assets. Security requirements analysis are then carried out to de-
ne what is required to secure the network. This typically includes the creation of
the high-level security policy documents. Which security mechanisms are needed
can then be planned for, and specic security controls - such as rewalls and l-
tering routers - can be developed and implemented [30].
Tsoumas and Tryfonas suggests a system to automate some of the develop-
ment phase of the development life cycle [33]. Their system is top-down, and
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takes a natural language description of a policy, such as the recommendations
from a risk analysis, and creates a formal model of a security policy. This is an
attempt to ll the gap between high-level policy statements, risk analysis output
and standards - shown in Figure 1 - and the network security policy denition.
The typical approach is to task experienced administrators, along with man-
agement input, to translate the high-level security requirements into a network
security policy. Their research did not produce a prototype system and is left
as theory, but it is an interesting idea, as potentially the system could relieve
the administrators of the time consuming and error prone policy creation task
[11, 19]. The authors suggest that their system, in conjunction with the output
from a Risk Analysis tool, could produce a security policy and recommendations
for administrators concerning deployment issues. They also suggest that a for-
mal model could be created using a high-level policy language such as Ponder
[34] or FLIP [35]. This would assist the administrators, as they would not have
to learn the high-level policy language used to describe the formal policy model.
The output from this system could be generated in the syntax of an existing
formal policy language. The system, would in this way, interface with high-level
policy language based systems described next.
High-level Policy Languages Currently, there is no generally accepted high-
level model, which is commonly used for policy conguration [36]. The following
quotes back this up:
\The thing to note here is that there is no xed terminology for the
description of rewalls." { [1]
\generic data models and high-level languages for router conguration
do not exist and are likely to remain elusive for some time" { [18]
Research by Guttman, which was funded by the NSA, led to a system called
NPT. The system can dene an overall access policy in a high-level policy lan-
guage, and verify that packet ltering specications, which it generates, enforce
the policy [37]. They suggest a high-level access policy language to describe
which packets can get where in an organisation's network. This is an abstract
language, above and independent of, device conguration languages. The system
deals with a global policy, covering the entire network access policy, not just the
ltering at a single network boundary. Logical `ltering postures', which dene
packet ltering at each device, are generated by the system. The motivation for
the system was this creation of multiple lters to enforce the global access pol-
icy. The lters do not dene the conguration of rewalls, but only the logical
access policy. This assists the network administrators in delegating the ltering
to various devices around the network, to enforce the overall policy, but the
administrators would have to then manually create the device congurations.
As the system describes the relationship between devices, it needs a descrip-
tion of the networks topology. This is modelled using a bipartite graph, and
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specied using a policy specication language. The areas of the network are rep-
resented by nodes, as are the ltering devices which route trac between the
areas. The (undirected) edges between the nodes represent the interfaces of the
devices connected to the dierent areas. Each interface can have an associated
`ltering posture' created, in both an inbound and outbound directions. These
postures are abstract representation of the bi-directional packet ltering that is
enforced by routing and rewall devices.
A Lisp type language is used to describe the access policy and the network
topology, and the ltering posture NPT generates. An example of the language
is shown in Listing 1.1. This consists of source and destination hosts and ar-
eas, and the trac which is allowed to ow between them. This system can be
categorised as top-down, as the network administrator would have to manually
create the abstract access policies in the modeling language, as well as the net-
work topology information. The interface to the system is text based, and the
administrator would have to learn the lisp type policy specication language
and become familiar with this way of modeling the access policy. This is not the
most complex of the high-level policy languages encountered in the review of
this literature, but it would still be a challenge for administrators to learn and
use.
Listing 1.1. NPT Language Code Snippet [37]
( de f ined host s e t s ; d e f i n e some host s e t s
( i n t e r n a l ; new name
( ( areas eng ine e r i ng ; two areas
f i n a n c i a l ) ) )
Guttmans NPT system also can also audit the lters it generates, by compar-
ing them to the global policy specication. This veries that the lters created,
correctly implement the overall policy. This conformance checking could be use-
ful if the administrator makes changes to the lters, and wants to validate them
against the overall access control policy. However, this auditing facility could
only be used in the design stage of the SDLC, as once the lters have been
implemented on devices, the validation would no longer provide any assurance
of the implemented security measures. To use this in the operations phase, a
mechanism would have to be added to reverse engineer the high-level language
policy from the congured devices, before running the auditing facility.
Later research by Guttman documents an evaluation of the NPT system, by
generating ltering postures from a realistic sized network. They use a dozen
ltering devices connecting sixteen network areas and their evaluation metric
consisted of timings of the system runs. Their performance evaluation produced
results which seem usable, with runs only taking seconds. Some problems were
encountered with their system. These were mainly concerning the usability of
the system. Specically, administrators had diculty when creating the network
and policy denitions in the abstract language, and also when trying to translate
the ltering postures into concrete device congurations, such as Cisco router
ACLs [38]. The administrators found it hard to work with the abstract policy
12 Review of Security Policy Implementations
representations, particularly when trying to create a representation of an exist-
ing network policy [38]. Another tool, the Atomizer, was created to assist the
administrators in this task [39]. It can take Cisco ACL congurations (Cisco
ltering language used on routers and rewalls) as input and generates abstract
NPT policy specications, combining common trac ltering behaviors. The
tool uses BDDs to model the trac ltering policy generated from the device
congurations, and `atomizes' the sets of trac within the lters together. The
output of the NPT system, however, is still in the dicult to use and does not
provide automatic generation of rewall rule sets.
The work of Bartal, Mayer, Nissim, and Wool started with the Firmato Fire-
wall Management Toolkit [40] in 1999, which is another top-down, conguration
generation system. A high-level policy language is used to create a, vendor in-
dependent global policy, which can be compiled into individual vendor specic
device congurations. The high-level policy denition language is used to manu-
ally specify the network topology and the high-level security policy. This is then
translated into an entity-relationship model which is a role based model of the
access policy and its relationship to the network topology.
One of the aims of the Firmato system was to separate the network topol-
ogy and the high-level policy denitions, which is an improvement on the work
of Guttman, as changes to the topology does not mean that the policy has to
be reworked. Other motivations behind the system were to abstract the pol-
icy away from low-level languages, enabling vendor independent management
of rewall congurations, and to automatically generate congurations, across
multiple ltering devices, from the abstract global policy.
The high-level policy language used to describe the abstract policy is called
MDL and is used to specify both the policy, and the network topology. An exam-
ple of the MDL language is shown in Listing 1.2. Again, like the rst generation
system from [38], the administrator has to manually create these denitions.
Listing 1.2. MDL Code Snippet [40]
corp gw =
f
I dmz corp : f addr=ether0 , INVIS ,
f i l e = ` `RULES I dmz corp ' ' g
I c o r p i n : f addr=ether1 , INVIS ,
f i l e = ` ` RULES I corp in ' ' g
I admin : f addr=ether2 ,
ip = 111 . 2 2 2 . 3 . 1 , f i l e = ` `RULES I admin ' 'g
g : LMF
The language is very dierent from the conguration languages of rewalls,
and administrators generally nd this type of language problematic to use [38].
In the testing of the Firmato system, existing rewall rules were converted into
MDL manually, but rule sets with under 50 rules were used. The authors recog-
nised that any more rules would have necessitated an automated mechanism
for translating the rules into MDL. The system does improve on the work by
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[38], solving one of their systems main problems, in that the administrator does
not now have to translate abstract lter denitions into the low-level device
congurations, as this can performed automatically. A limitation of both this
system and Guttman's is that it models a closed rewall with only pass rules,
and a single drop `all other trac' rule at the end of the rule set. This means
the rule set is conict free, but may have more rules than necessary, and may
be more dicult to understand for the administrator. The interface provided to
the administrator is textual, using text les, and no GUI was provided. This
was regarded as a surprise success of the system, and an important feature for
end-users [40]. However, as a survey carried out by [31] shows, this is not so
surprising. The survey found that a majority of system administrators preferred
a text based CLI, due to CLIs being more reliable, faster, and more robust.
Around the same time, research at Cisco Systems by [21] produced a policy-
based management system. This can model abstract ltering device polices, and
automatically create the low-level device congurations, in the form of Cisco
ACLs. The system can create ltering device policies, for multiple devices, from
global policy rules, as well as performing some basic rule set analysis. The moti-
vation for the system is summarised in the title of their research paper `Policy-
Based Management: Bridging the Gap' [21]. The gap between device congura-
tions and the high-level, natural language, security policy is dicult to bridge
for system administrators, and the research introduces a functional language to
express the high-level policy. This is done in a precise way, using nested sets of
conditional statements. An example of the language, taken from [21], is shown
in Listing 3.3. This language has to be manually created by the system admin-
istrator, which is a drawback of the system, as the administrator would have to
learn this abstract high-level language as well as the low-level device languages.
Listing 1.3. Code Snippet of an HTTP Policy [21]
corp gw =
f
I f S e rv i c e i s HTTP
I f Des t inat i on i s S
I f Source i s H
Se rv i c e l e v e l i s premium
Permit
Else I f Source i s N1 or N4
I f Source i s N4
Use encrypt ing tunne l
Permit
The system was implemented as part of the CSPM tool [41], and its func-
tionality has since been incorporated into the Cisco's latest security management
tool, Cisco Security Manager [42]. The CSPM interface is a GUI which provides
the administrator with a tree view to implement both the policy and the net-
work topology information. The topology tree represents the enforcement devices
(rewalls and ltering routers) and the network areas between the devices. The
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policy tree contains a policy structure with the individual policies, dened in the
abstract policy language. These can then be applied to the enforcement devices in
the topology tree to enforce policies between the network zones. Figure 4, taken
from [42],shows the interface to the CSPM tool. Note for the two trees, the top
represents the policy, and the bottom the network topology. Note also that the
inner security policy has been applied to the PIX2 rewall device, which seems
to be segmenting a specic internal network from the general internal network.
Fig. 4. Cisco Security Policy Manager GUI [42]
The generation of the ltering device congurations consists of four steps.
Firstly, the high-level policy is applied to device and the policy is distilled into
rules which are applicable to the individual devices. The authors call this process
pruning and involves a mechanism to detect if policy rules specify trac which
could pass through each device. In this way, devices only receive rules which are
needed on the device. This is an improvement on, and in contrast with, the sys-
tems discussed previously which either apply all rules to all devices, or perform
very minimal pruning. The second step in the process is some simple rule set
analysis. This checks that the device has resources to carry out the policy, such
as the memory available for ltering rules. It also performs some rule set anomaly
analysis, checking for conicting, or overlapping, ltering rules. An example of
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conicting rules would be if the lter has the same source and destination ad-
dress and the same service, but dierent actions. The administrator is warned
about any analysis problems and the administrator would have to decide on the
solution, such as which of the two conicting rules would be used in the rule
set. The next step is to generate the device lters. The tool creates an inter-
mediate, abstract, lter rule set for each device and stores them in a database.
This stores the semantics of the device congurations to be created, but leaves
the creation to an agent which reads the generic lter rules and creates low-level
rules in the device conguration language. This means ltering devices could be
interchanged and the fourth stage repeated to create congurations for the new
devices. Although this is a Cisco specic closed system, it could in theory be
used to create other vendor device congurations, if agents were added to do
this.
The system is MS Windows-based, and provides only a GUI for the network
administrator. There is no support for the CLI and this means the tool, even
in its latest form, cannot be scripted. This is something that is sought after
by administrators, so the tool can be combined with other tools, and provides
customisation in their work practices [32]. Small conguration changes could
be time consuming to perform in this type of system, as the high-level policies
would have to be studied and amended, and the fourth stage process run again.
This type of all or nothing conguration generation may not be very useable for
the system administrator [43].
Several other similar approaches, using high-level policy languages and cre-
ating low-level device congurations from them, appear in the literature. [44]
describes a similar system to Guttman's, with the addition of modeling and
conguring NIDS as well as rewalls. PRESTO is a conguration management
system for routers [45]. It is interesting, in the way it extends the low-level con-
guration language, creating a hybrid scripting language rather than introducing
an entirely new language. Templates, or conglets, are used with information em-
bedded into the low-level conguration language. These are then used at runtime
to generate the low-level congurations, with a database providing the content
of the templates.
The Ponder policy specication language can be used to specify the entire
high-level security policy, including access control policies, user authorisation
policies, and trac ltering policies [34]. Ponder seems more complex than is
needed to specify device ltering policies. The high-level rewall policy modeling
language, FLIP [35], can also be compiled into low-level device congurations.
The scope of the FLIP system is global and can manage rewalls across an entire
network. FLIP generates conict free rules automatically, by performing conict
analysis as it generates the low-level device congurations. This improves on
most of the systems described, which would need to be analysed separately for
rule conicts, although tying the functionality together like this means less exi-
bility [32]. Another high-level policy language, AFPL [46, 47], resulted from work
at the University of Seville. This, again, intends to ll the gap between high-level
network security policies and low-level rewall languages. It has been designed to
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be simpler than some of the preceding high-level languages while still retaining
the functionality needed to describe ltering policies and can also be automati-
cally compiled into leading vendor rewall ltering languages. A similar proposal
by Hinrichs et al. in [48] is the Flow-based Management Language (FML). FML
is a formal, high-level network policy specication language designed to replace
the low-level policy rules by controlling the `ows' of data within the network,
regardless of the physical devices that they ow through. After specifying a pol-
icy, FML can be translated to low-level network hardware conguration rule
sets automatically, using tools provided by the authors. This work contributes
a novel, extensible, adaptable and ecient mechanism for controlling network
access. High-level policy languages, nevertheless, face a common hurdle in accep-
tance from administrators, who generally do not welcome the overheads involved
with learning and using them [19].
3.4 SDLC Implementation Phase
Policy Testing Systems Testing of packet ltering rule sets was explored
by Hazelhurst et al. in the late 1990's [49]. One of their main motivations for
their system was the analysis of low-level rule sets to understand the policy
they implement. This ended up being the main focus of research, with a query-
based system being developed to analyse rule sets. BDDs were used to represent
rewall and router access policies. Each rule in the rule set can be converted into
a Boolean expression, and the Boolean expressions combined in a BDD. Queries
are used to pose questions about the rules, which can then be answered using
the BDDs. An example of these `what if?' queries might be `which destination
addresses can packets reach from a source address and a certain port?'. The user
can analyse, and so test, a policy by querying the rule set in various ways. This
can be used to validate and explore the policy before deploying the rule set onto
ltering devices. The language used to specify the queries is a functional language
`FL', and the output is a textual representation of the query answer. The FL
query language is low-level and is dicult to use, for the system administrator
when creating queries. This was recognised, and the system was improved to
include a GUI for easier querying of the policy [50]. The authors also recognised
that the best interface was a GUI for visualising important information about
the rule set, and for basic querying, but a textual interface was better suited
for an advanced user to develop more powerful queries [50]. The scope of the
system only extends to a single rule set, but later research expanded query-
based systems to cover entire networks, some of which are covered later in this
paper. The primary analysis mechanism is the manual query and answer system,
but a basic rule set conict analysis process was also developed. This automated
the task of detecting redundant rules in the rules set prior to deployment. This
seems to be one of the rst systems to perform conict analysis within rule sets
and is cited by most research in the area.
The research of Mayer, Wool, and Ziskind continued with the creation of the
FANG system [51]. This was built from earlier research into the Firmato system
[40], and FANG is actually an analysis engine which runs on top of the same
Computers and Security 17
Firmato policy model. It can be used in the Implementation phase, to test a
policy before it is deployed, and could also be use in the Operations phase to
audit a deployed policy. It has functionality to build the model from existing
ltering congurations, so it is classed as a bottom-up system. It can take Cisco
Router conguration les or Lucent Firewall les as input to create the policy
model. It uses a separate parser module for each ltering device it supports.
This is a good system as it support extensibility. The system works on multiple
ltering devices, and so a global policy can be tested. A network topology has
to be entered, and this is still done manually using the MDL language, the same
way as described for the Firmato system. The queries which can be performed
on the FANG system are based around a triple of source host group (source
network address range), a destination host group (destination network address
range) and a network service. Queries can be created such as (*, web servers,
http services) to nd the answers to questions, such as `which systems have
access to the organisations web servers'. A GUI was created to perform queries,
and drop down menus implement the query triples. An example, taken from [40],
showing the result of a query asking `which services can get from the internal
network to the DMZ network', is shown in gure 5.
Fig. 5. The FANG systems GUI showing results of a query [40]
A similar query-based system, which was created for the Linux iptables re-
wall, is ITVal [52]. It uses MDDs rather then BDDs, but operates in much the
same way. Their main motivation was to provide a simple query tool to aid
in rewall conguration, so an administrator could test a rewall conguration
before deploying it. The query language is designed to be simple and natural lan-
guage based. A single iptables rule set can be read in by the tool and a MDDs
model built. The queries are created in the English-based query language and
return a simple textual answer, in a similar way as the FANG system does.
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The main problem with analysis systems using queries, is that they have to
be created by the administrator. The system administrator has to learn another
query language, as well as knowing which queries to perform. The onus is on the
administrator to work out what, and when, to query.
These o-line passive testing systems have advantages over active testing
systems, such as vulnerability testing or penetration testing, as they can be
performed before policies are deployed. With active testing the policy has to be
deployed before testing, and if problems are found, the production network is
vulnerable until a solution can be deployed [51].
Policy Deployment The SNMP protocol [53] was developed by the IETF in
the 1980's as a comprehensive network management system. It was intended to
be a standard way of managing increasing numbers of devices, across hetero-
geneous networks. Its functionality includes the ability to congure managed
devices remotely. It is implemented as `agents' on network devices, and the con-
guration is modeled using MIBs which store information on each specic device.
In a workshop held by the IETF in 2002, attended by protocol developers and
network administrators, it was found that SNMP was not being used to con-
gure network devices as much as they originally intended. One of the main
issues raised was device manufacturers have not implemented all the parts of
the protocol needed to read and write congurations to and from devices. As
the following, from the 2003 workshop [54] on the subject, states:
\There is too little deployment of writable MIB modules. While there are
some notable exceptions in areas, such as cable modems where writable
MIB modules are essential, it appears that router equipment is usually
not fully congurable via SNMP" { [54]
\It is usually not possible to retrieve complete device congurations via
SNMP so that they can be compared with previous congurations or
checked for consistency across devices. There is usually only incomplete
coverage of device features via the SNMP interface, and there is a lack
of dierentiation between conguration data and operational state data
for many features." { [54]
It seems network device vendors are reluctant to fully implement the SNMP
agents on their devices, thus their own proprietary languages are needed to
manage the device congurations. SNMP is widely supported by vendors, but
mostly the monitoring part of the protocol is implemented, rather than the
conguration part [55]. This could be a good business decision for vendors, as
rather than the administrator using the same IETF protocol on any device, they
have to become familiar with that vendor's low-level device specic language,
and perhaps have to take some training courses from that vendor. For example,
Cisco OSs have subtle dierences across their range of network products, and
dierent certications are needed to manage the dierent devices. Investment
in training administrators in a vendor's products can make it dicult to justify
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using any other vendor's products [18]. Vendors typically provide GUI-based
products to perform some management of the devices, but these are normally
aimed at simple initial setups and inexperiences users performing basic tasks
[54]. Network administrators invariably have to use the CLI to perform more
complicated management work. In the workshop reported in [54] the CLI was
found to be the administrator's favorite way of conguring devices.
Apart from SNMP, several other systems were also discussed at the workshop
including the CIM [56], the COPS [57], and using the device CLI and SSH, for
conguration management. It was decided that neither CIM or COPS addressed
the needs of the users, and that a new vendor independent conguration man-
agement protocol was needed. The XML based Netconf protocol [58] was born
out of the recommendations from this workshop. Netconf was designed to be a
simple mechanism through which device congurations can be managed, using
an XML-based system [59]. The entire, or partial, XML encoded congurations,
of a Netconf enabled device can be retrieved, updated, and deployed back to the
device by remote management applications. The protocols control messages are
encoded in XML, as well as the data being sent. Major network device vendors,
such as Cisco and Juniper Networks, now have XML-based agents in their latest
products and are participating in Netconf standardisation [60]. Cisco Netconf
conguration is detailed in [61], and Juniper in [62]. XML has many advantages
over SNMP, such as XML is human readable, there are many standard tools
and libraries for parsing and processing XML, and XML-based languages are
extensible by the user [63].
3.5 SDLC Operation and Maintenance Phase
The operations phase of the SDLC includes conguration management of de-
ployed security systems. This could range from small changes to a single de-
vice, to implementation of an new security policy over the entire network. This
phase also includes monitoring and auditing of deployed systems, checking for
compliance with policies and procedures. This can be done by comparing the
implemented mechanisms with the higher level policy denitions. System Ad-
ministrators can also use these auditing systems to help with their understanding
of deployed policy implementations. For example to create high-level policies for
management where none currently exist, or during the process of making changes
to device congurations. Understanding deployed policies can be extremely chal-
lenging [64], especially if the policy is being enforced across many devices over
an entire network. Periodic testing of security mechanisms is also recommended
in this phase of the life cycle, to check the systems for, and alert administrators
to, the latest security vulnerabilities. The auditing and testing processes can be
carried out in parallel, and both aim to highlight any weaknesses in the current
security solution, and possibly to suggest improvements. This would then feed
back into the development phase of the SDLC, as part of a continual process, to
improve the security policies and implementation [65, 4]. This continual security
process is shown in Figure 3, and summarised nicely by the following quote from
[1].
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\Implement measures which will protect your assets in a cost eective man-
ner. Review the process continuously and make improvements each time a weak-
ness is found." Fraser et al. [1]
Policy Auditing Systems Some of the systems discussed previously can also
be used for testing or auditing of deployed access control policies. Such as the
FANG system [51]. It can reverse engineer a model of a policy from rewall
congurations. The administrator can then query the policy, to become familiar
with it before changes are made, or to check it matches the overall security
requirements. This auditing system has been improved on, by the creation of
the Lumeta Firewall Analyser [64, 11]. This improved on the Fang system by
automatically creating the queries needed to analyse the rewall policy model.
Lumeta generates what the authors describe as the most interesting queries, and
then displays the answers to these queries. This tries to highlight possible risks in
the rewall policy, and to limit the need for user input to the system. The authors
recognised the fact that one of the problems with their earlier system was that
the administrator had to decide which queries to ask the system, and then create
the queries manually. This is described as a major usability problem with FANG
[64]. In the FANG system, the administrator has to enter the network topology
description manually using the Firmato MDL language. Using this language
was raised as a problem by beta testers and in the new Lumeta system, the
routing table is used to create this automatically. The GUI to FANG, shown in
Figure 5, was also replaced as it was deemed dicult to use by testers. This has
been replaced by a batch process which performs a comprehensive simulation of
trac through the rewall policy and reports on this. This is interesting as the
administrator users found the original Firmato CLI interface easy to use, and
yet it was replaced with a GUI. This shows the design was perhaps not tailored
to the type of user correctly [32]. The output from the system is now a report in
the form of web pages, with the ability to drill down into more detail if the users
needs to. Using HTML to provide this type of exible reporting is described as
an ideal mechanism for security analysis tools [32]. The FANG system can only
translate Lucent Managed Firewall, which does not have a large market share.
The Lumeta system added parser modules for CheckPoint rewall and Cisco
ACL congurations, so heterogeneous networks could be modeled, and therefore
the product would be useful to a wider audience. The low-level congurations are
abstracted to the Lucent Managed Firewall based language used by Firmato and
FANG, and the analysis query engine uses this as input. The Lucent Managed
Firewall language was used as it is contains high-level constructs and is easy to
parse. The Lumeta architecture, taken from [11], is shown in 6.
The Lumeta system has since been developed into a commercial product, the
Algosec Firewall Analyser from Algorithmic Security Inc. [66], which provides
multi-vendor rewall analysis, monitoring and auditing. The Firewall Analyser
system supports the major enterprise rewall platforms: CheckPoint Firewall-1
software rewall (which runs on various hardware platforms), Cisco PIX, ASA
and Router rewalls, and Juniper Netscreen.
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Fig. 6. The Lumeta system architecture [11]
DePaul University in Chicago has contributed greatly to research in the ar-
eas of rewall policy modeling and analysis. Al-Shaer and Hamed have been
the main contributors, with over a dozen publications between them. Their rst
research into rewall policy analysis was concerned with auditing legacy rewall
policies to automatically discover conicts and anomalies in rewall policies.
This anomaly checking can also assist administrators when editing the deployed
policies [16, 67]. The rule set conict detection aims to highlight possible prob-
lems in a rule set based on the order of the rules, and the dependencies between
rules due to the ordering. For example a more general rule before a more specic
rule in a rule set, would mean the more specic rule would never be reached.
The more specic rule is classied as `shadowed' by the rst rule if the ltering
actions taken are dierent (pass and drop), or `redundant' if the actions are
the same (for example, both rules pass the packet). These are classed, by the
authors, as rule set `anomalies' [67]. The FPA tool was created, based around a
formal model of the rewall rules and the relationships between them. Modeling
of the ltering policies is done using BDDs and algorithms to detect anomalies
in the rule set model, have been created. To prove the concept they demonstrate
a ve tuple ltering syntax, which is used to describe the ltering rules used
as input to the system. This maps directly from current low-level ltering lan-
guages, such as Cisco ACLs. The format of the ve tuple ltering rule is shown
in Listing 1.4. The literature only shows examples of these commonly used l-
tering elds, but the authors state this could easily be extended to include any
other ltering elds from low-level languages [16]. This could be extended to in-
clude the ltering options available in modern low-level ltering languages, such
as Cisco ACLs or Linux IP Tables. Note that the lters used in the examples
only use classful ranges of IP addresses, and classless ranges would need a more
sophisticated wildcard specication. Al-Shaer and Hamed dene all the possible
relationships between rules, which are then proved mathematically to be the
union of all possible relations [16].
Listing 1.4. Format of ltering rules, used as input to the FPA tool [16]
<order> <protoco l><s r c i p><s r c po r t><ds t ip><dst por t> <act ion>
The rewall rule set, and the relations within, are then modeled as a BDD.
This is then represented as a policy tree, with nodes on the tree representing
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ltering elds, and branches being the values. Each path through the tree rep-
resents a rule in the input rule set. This model was chosen, as the rule set and
the anomalies can be visualised by the users. An example of this type of tree,
taken from [68], is shown in Figure 7.
Fig. 7. FPA tool BDD Tree model of a ltering rule set [68]
Algorithms to detect any anomalies within the rule set are then run, and can
be displayed to the user in the FPA tool interface. The interface provided by the
system is a GUI, which can show the policy tree, and any rule set anomalies.
The interface is shown in Figure 8, which is taken from [16]. The policy tree
is shown in the left hand pane, and the discovered anomalies in the right hand
pane. The rule set is shown in the bottom pane, with the conicts highlighted.
The FPA tool also allows the user to maintain the rule set, inserting, modifying
and deleting rules. As the user edits the rules, the tool provides feedback on any
conicts that may be introduced by these actions.
Although the use of system is described as analysis of legacy rewall policies,
by the authors, no automatic importing of these policies is described. The system
seems to need an administrator to manually translate the low-level rule set into
the ve tuple syntax. This would classify the systems top-down, however, the
translation of deployed policies is not dicult as it is a direct mapping from
most rewall conguration languages. Fixed format congurations from devices
can be easily parsed using a scripting language, such as Perl [64].
The authors regarded this system as a step forward from the query-based
analysis systems such as FANG [51] and Lumeta [64]. The main reason for this
is that it takes much more eort to redene deployed rules sets into the high-
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Fig. 8. FPA tool GUI [16]
level policy specication languages used by these systems, rather than analysing
the rule sets directly with the FPA system [68].
The scope of the FPA system was a single device and rule set, but this was
extended to anomaly detection across multiple rewalls [24, 69]. Further research
extended the system to include other ltering devices, including IDS, and VPN
gateways, and the inter-device anomaly analysis, across the global policy [70].
The FIREMAN Firewall Analysis system [71] can perform analysis of rewall
ltering, detecting redundant and conicting rules, which may point to miscon-
gurations. Again, BDDs are used to model one or more rewalls. The analysis
can discover mis-congurations, similar to anomalies dened in the FPA system,
as well as detecting policy violations in the policy. The policy violations are
based on a blacklist or whitelist input by the user, as well as a general policy for
all rule sets based on the twelve common rewall conguration errors identied
by [10]. The model is created with a bottom-up approach, by parsing device
conguration les. An evaluation of the system was carried out, by creating ar-
ticial rule sets of up to 800 rules. Performance evaluation was carried out based
on timing metrics. The experimental conditions used, were rule sets increasing
size. The system can analyse up to 800 rules in less than three seconds.
Research at AT&T labs produced a conguration auditing and management
system called EDGE [18]. It creates an abstract model of the networks routing
information by reading in and processing entire device conguration les. The
network is modeled using an entity relationship model stored in a database of
network services described in the conguration les. O-line analysis of the net-
work conguration is then provided, and reports are generated. These can be
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used to identify problems such as inconsistent routing congurations on devices.
The administrator can decide whether to correct these highlighted problems,
before the system rewrites the congurations back out to the devices. This is
an example of a pragmatic, bottom-up, approach to modeling from network
congurations. The motivation for the system is similar to many of the re-
wall management systems. The conguration languages used to congure these
complex routing systems are dicult for the administrator to get right. Automa-
tion provisioning of congurations is proposed as a solution in this case, with
the database model of the current network being used to facilitate this. The
interface to the system is via the EDGE web site. EDGE users have access to
their own networks data. Various network visualisations are available to help the
administrator understand the policies, such as network topology and routing in-
formation. Various web-based reports are also available on request. This system
has been successfully commercialised, and runs daily on thousands of enterprise
networks, helping administrators manage complex networks [18].
One of the main problem with systems which convert to and from vendor
specic congurations, such as the systems discussed in this section, is that the
conguration languages tend to change rapidly. For example, Cisco's ACL lter-
ing language has had many additional features added to it since the rst version
in the mid 1990s. This means that the parser modules have to be continually
reviewed, to keep them up to date with the latest language changes [18].
\Command line interfaces often lack proper version control for the syntax
and the semantics. It is therefore time consuming and error prone to maintain
programs or scripts that interface with dierent versions of a command line
interface." { [54]
As part of another conguration management system being developed by
Caldwell et al., some interesting research into Cisco Router IOS parsing and
modeling was carried out at AT&T Labs. In [72], a learning system and adap-
tive parser are described. The overall system will be able to process and extract
information from existing network congurations, much as described in their pre-
vious work with the EDGE system [18], but the parser can adapt to changes in
the conguration language being parsed. The parser is automatically generated
from valid congurations, which are fed into the learning system. The system, if
perfected, would not need manual changes to be made whenever the congura-
tion language version had new features introduced. This would overcome one of
the major problems with the bottom-up approach to any type of policy model-
ing, especially when dealing with rapidly changing conguration languages such
as Cisco device operating systems.
Reverse Engineering Security Policies Al-Shaer and Hamed, at DePaul
University seem to have produced the rst research into reverse engineering
of natural language, high-level policies from existing device congurations in
2002 [16, 73]. They aggregate network services together, using their FPA system
model as a base, and produce a basic text based abstract policy description
from a ltering rule set. They take their BDD model of the ltering rule set, and
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create another BDD based on network services from that. Services can then be
aggregated together, changing it into a form which can be presented to the user
in a natural language. The interface for the tool was a GUI showing the network
services based tree and the textual representation of the policy. Figure 9, taken
from [16], shows the network service-based tree and the high-level policy which
has been inferred.
Fig. 9. Policy Inference Tool GUI [16]
The creation of an abstract high-level policy from low-level device cong-
urations is a fairly new subject for research. The 2007 paper by Tongaonkar,
Inamdar, and Sekar describes a technique to extract the high-level security pol-
icy from analysis of the low-level representation of a rule set [74]. Their system
attempts to atten the rule set, by aggregating overlapping rules together, thus
eliminating the dependency on the order of the rules. This also reduces the size
and complexity of the rule set, hopefully giving the administrator a better un-
derstanding of the policy it represents. This is a similar technique to the [16]
system.
In [22], Bishop and Peisert developed a system of reverse engineering access
control policies from Linux le system access control congurations. This doesn't
involve rewall policies however, only user access policies from Linux password
les. Around the same time Golnabi et al. have also worked on the problem of
inferring high-level policies [75], but their approach is based around an active
system, and the data mining of the device logs, and not by static analysis of
the device congurations. Similarly, Abedin et al. in [76] describe techniques
used to mine rewall log les to regenerate eective rewall rules. Their method
uses algorithms to reduce the data set through mining of rewall network trac
logs using packet frequencies. These are then used to calculate the occurrence
of each attribute of a log record in a rewall log le, thus generating primitive
rules. Firewall rules are then regenerated from these primitive rules using ag-
gregation and a set of heuristics. Anomalies in the original rule set and defects
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in the rewall implementation are then identied through a comparison of the
regenerated rules with the original, manually-dened rules.
Policy Visualisation Another way to analyse or validate a policy is to graphi-
cally represent the rule set in some form. This technique has been used in several
tools to some extent, for example the FPA system Al-Shaer and Hamed uses vi-
sualisation of BDDs tree to represent the rewall policy. This was regarded as an
important design feature. The choice of a BDD as a model was used over, faster
modeling techniques for simplicity and ease of visualisation to the user [67].
[77] describes a rewall packet lter visualisation tool, PolicyVis. A GUI
provides the administrator with a visualisation of packets passed or blocked by
the rewall, based on a set of specied query parameters. The administrator can
enter queries, much like the Firmato or FANG systems, and instead of textual
answers, a visualisation of the ltered trac is generated. Like the query-based
systems reviewed earlier in this paper, this leaves the administrator to create
the queries.
[19] discusses a system, to compliment the CLI, visualising the most complex
parts of the policy. Their system was based around improving the usability of
network administrators current systems, by complimenting them with visualisa-
tions, but not replacing them. Their approach is dierent from the clean-slate
approaches taken in some of the systems reviewed in this section, such as with
new high-level policy specication languages. They assume that the administra-
tor prefers the low-level CLI based tools, they are familiar with, and attempt
to give additional usablility through visaulisation rather than replacing the CLI
tools. This assumption is made, based on research into the network administra-
tion community and the context of the work administrators perform [31, 78].
4 Conclusions
This paper explored literature in the areas of network security, security policies,
policy enforcement, and rewall policy management systems. A taxonomy of
systems which aid the administrator in the management of rewall policies, was
also carried out. It has been shown that security policies play a central and im-
portant role in network security. High-level policies are created with input from
management, and are typically written in a natural language. These policies then
have to be mapped to the technical policies which network devices enforce. The
process of mapping these high-level policies to low-level device congurations is
normally performed manually by network administrators. This task is dicult
and error prone as there is a large conceptual gap between the high-level policies
and the congurations. The low-level rewall policies themselves are dicult
to understand, reverse engineer, and maintain due to the complexity in large
rule sets, and the fact that overall policies are sometime enforced over multi-
ple rewalls and ltering devices. Many systems to help with the understanding
and management of these policies have been proposed in the literature. Much
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research into policy-based systems has been carried out, including high-level ab-
stract policy languages, query-based rule set testing systems, and rewall rule
set auditing systems. High-level languages, used to bridge the gap between high-
level policies and low-level rewall congurations have been developed, but have
some problems. A common problem with abstract policy languages is that they
require conguration by specialists. The administrator typically does not want
to, or have the time to learn these new languages. Some of the languages also
have limitations with the features they support. Query-based analysis systems
have been produced specically for rewall auditing, and analyse the rewall rule
set by simulating network trac passing through the rewall, based on queries
input by the user. Some have overcome the problem of abstract language based
systems, as they use models hidden from the user, which can be created from de-
vice congurations automatically. Some query-based systems have problems also,
as they put the onus on the administrator to create the queries, and sometimes
to learn a new query language which leads to the same problems as high-level
modeling languages. Other o-line auditing systems were reviewed, including
rule set anomaly detection systems, visualisation systems, and high-level policy
reverse engineering systems - which are still in their infancy. From the review, it
was highlighted that o-line conguration analysis is the area were some of these
systems have become commercialised, such as automated rewall conguration
analysis, and routing conguration analysis. These o-line passive systems have
advantages over active testing systems, such as vulnerability testing, as they can
be performed before policies are deployed. Another issue raised in the research
more than once, was that of which interface systems had. Network and security
administrators prefer a low-level, textual based CLI interface over an abstract
interface, such as a GUI for most tasks.
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